

STANDARD FORM NO. 64
Approved For Release 2000/09/14 : CIA-RDP88-00374R000100260037-2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
25X1A

TO :



DATE: 2 December 1954

FROM : VP

SUBJECT: Discussions of questions sent you.

1. There are attached hereto copies of the discussions mentioned above. These seem to have been changed since I first saw them, for there is no mention of a duplication of the Doelittle investigation, nor is there any mention of the question as to whether or not CIA is over-security conscious.

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1. To What Extent Should the Task Force Devote its Efforts to the Question of Communist or Subversive Infiltration or of other internal Security Measures of the Intelligence Agencies Surveyed?

Discussion: Certainly the Task Force should inquire thoroughly into the subject of internal security measures in effect in each agency, because if they are either poor or excessive the production of intelligence is jeopardized, and if excessive the costs in personnel, time and money cannot be justified. As to the question of communists or subversive infiltration, it is believed that past publicity on this subject requires that sufficient inquiries into this subject be made to determine the system used by each agency to detect and expell personnel of that type, and to determine, within the CIA, the possible or probable presence of personnel of that type.

2. To what extent should we survey the domestic and overseas offices of the various intelligence agencies?

Discussion: While it is realized that there is a limitation on personnel, time and money for the conduct of this survey, nevertheless it is essential that the survey include thorough coverage of a sufficient number of field offices and activities which will enable the Task Force to determine all factual information concerning this project. Such factual information will be found largely in the field offices and activities of CIA and NSC. These should be covered to the full extent permitted by personnel, time and money available. At present there appears to be no real need for visiting field offices and activities of other Government intelligence agencies.

3. To what extent should we inquire into the activities of the National Security Agency and into the communications intelligence activities of other intelligence agencies?

Discussion: Since these activities represent a large and important part of the entire field of intelligence production, it is believed that a survey of Government intelligence agencies and activities would be incomplete without a careful inquiry into the organization, scope, efficiency and usefulness of operations being carried on in the realm of communications, intelligence, radio intercept, and electromagnetic warfare.

4. To what extent should we inquire into the counterintelligence activities of the intelligence community

Discussion: It is the understanding of the writer that the counterintelligence (CI) domestically is the responsibility of the FBI; overseas in occupied areas is the responsibility of the Army; and overseas in unoccupied areas is the responsibility of the CIA, as directed by the NSC. A survey of the domestic CI would entail a complete survey of the FBI, and this is believed to be not within the scope of our mission. However, it is believed that we should make inquiries into the CI activities of the CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force overseas as may be necessary to determine the advisability of the allocations of fields of responsibility by the NSC; determine the efficiency and economy with which such responsibilities are being carried out; and determine any areas of duplication or overlap.

5. To what extent should we survey the intelligence activities of G-2, ONI and A-2?

Discussion: These three agencies have been engaged for years (A-2 as a part of the Army until the creation of Army Air Force early in WWII) in the collection and evaluation of that intelligence which would enable the Army, Navy and Air Force to determine the combat and war-making possibilities of potential enemy nations. They have never been, before outright hostilities, too concerned with the problem of maintaining friendly relations with other nations, and keeping us out of war; but, rather have left that problem to the State Department.

While on the surface there appears to have been a failure in combat and departmental intelligence on the part of the Army and/or Navy at Pearl Harbor and on the invasion of South Korea, actually the failures of these two occasions are more properly chargeable to the State Department because of their failure to keep the Army and Navy properly informed as to the extent of the deterioration of diplomatic relations in these two instances. There have been no other major failures in the production of national intelligence. The measures utilized by the Army, Navy and Air Force for the production of combat, tactical, strategic and departmental intelligence have been evolved over a great many years, and have been proved reasonably correct for each by the greatest test of all -- actual warfare on several occasions. It is, therefore, believed that an outside survey of the G-2, ONI and A-2, regardless of its findings as to the means, methods and efficiency with which they are producing departmental intelligence, will have no appreciable effect in inviting (?) those agencies to change their procedures. Hence, any survey of those agencies could well be limited to a survey of those procedures and activities only which touch on or are closely related to the activities of the CIA.

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TO : Mr. Carey

DATE: 2 December 1954

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approved for release through
the HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM of
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date

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